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Abstract 
 
This study is designed to isolate Wal-Mart’s effects on the retail sector employment 
index in Mexico at the federal entity level.  As Wal-Mart is the largest supermarket chain 
in Mexico and the largest private employer, the case will be made that the findings are 
indicative of the greater effects of the modern retail sector on the traditional retail sector.  
On a broader level, this paper will argue that the retailer justly serves as a representative 
of the Latin American Supermarket Trend, a phenomenon that has been propelled by the 
trade and investment liberalizations institutionalized by the ratification of NAFTA. The 
statistical analysis consists of various regressions using two weighted Wal-Mart store 
variables; as the dataset is time-series and cross-sectional, panel corrected standard errors 
and autocorrelation corrections are used.  Controlling for economic, political, geographic, 
and time trends, the results indicate that Wal-Mart’s presence has a negative effect on the 
retail sector employment index.  Furthermore, the retailer is not creating retail sales but is 
rather acquiring a larger piece of the retail sector pie. The entrance of one multinational 
corporation resulted in negative externalities in both the retail and agricultural sectors.  
Policy makers must consider the externalities associated with the pursuit of international 
economic integration and take appropriate measures for those unable to compete.   
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Introduction 
“Every Day Low Prices” (EDLP) is a phrase synonymous with the world’s largest 
retailer, the American-owned Wal-Mart.  For some it conjures up images of a bouncing 
smiley face and enthusiastic greeters, while others ponder unemployment checks and 
outsourcing.  Whatever the view, the retailer has likely imprinted an image in the psyches 
of all Americans from the lower classes to the business elite.  Some love it while others 
hate it, and yet it appears that the lovers are winning as Wal-Mart is now a multi-national 
company with stores in 15 countries (Wal-Mart on-line).  Its massive success has come 
with new catch phrases, such as EDLP, “the Wal-Mart Effect” and “Wal-Martization”, 
the latter two having rather negative connotations.   
Mexico is second only to the United States in total number of Wal-Mart stores 
and it follows that American retail transformations attributable to Wal-Mart, or the Blue 
Giant, may also be transpiring in Mexico.  One popular claim is that the retailer’s 
presence displaces smaller outlets, such as “mom and pop shops”.  The concern is that as 
these smaller stores close, jobs are lost and are replaced with lesser quality Wal-Mart 
positions1 or are not replaced at all.  As Mexican retail is characterized by neighborhood 
stores owned and operated by local families, examining the validity of this claim is 
imperative.  This paper tackles the question by isolating Wal-Mart’s effect on the retail 
sector employment index2.  
American examples of the “Wal-Mart Effect” may be seen in changing retail 
trends (Stone, 1997); state safety net programs (Dube and Jacobs, 2004); increasing 
family-poverty rates (Goetz & Swaminathan, 2006); and in the struggles and successes of 
                                                
1 The jobs may be of a lesser quality due to lower average wages or reduced benefits.   
2 This statistical portion of this study isolates Wal-Mart’s effect on the number of retail jobs and not the 
quality of those jobs. 
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companies such as Vlasic, Levi Strauss and The Lovable Company (Fishman, 2003).   
Efforts to sully the Wal-Mart image have been propelled by organizations such as the 
AFL-CIO and the groups Wal-Mart Watch and Wake Up Wal-Mart.  The question is, 
while considerable evidence has been found supporting the negative claims of unions and 
interest groups concerned with American business and retail, do similar arguments apply 
for the commercial sector in Mexico as well? 
In addition to the retailer’s relationship with Mexican retail, the case can be made 
that Wal-Mart’s effects are representative of the greater Latin American Supermarket 
Trend.  In Mexico, this trend has been propelled by the economic liberalizations 
institutionalized with the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1993.  This free trade treaty encourages international economic integration 
through the reduction of trade barriers and increased foreign investment, or as it is called, 
economic globalization.   
I make these connections to illustrate that the retailer is a suitable example of the 
multinational corporation often cheered or jeered in discussions of economic 
globalization3.  Statistical studies are useful insofar as they successfully explain a 
relationship between variables; this usefulness may be enhanced if the relationship can be 
generalized or compared to other relationships or trends.  While estimating Wal-Mart’s 
effects specific to Mexico’s retail sector employment is a worthy cause, the challenge is 
to illustrate that this relationship is indicative of the competition’s relationship with retail 
employment and the supermarket trend’s overall effect on retail employment.  The 
supermarket’s ability to enter the Mexican and greater Latin American markets has been 
                                                
3 Examples of often targeted multinational corporations include Wal-Mart, Nike, McDonald’s, and Shell 
Oil (Klein, 2002).   
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supported and encouraged by reduced trade barriers, and the case can be made that the 
effects of this trend are indicative of how economic liberalizations and the global 
integration of markets may affect domestic retail employment rates.  That does not imply 
that the results of this study must also be the case wherever there are reduced trade 
barriers and a Wal-Mart, but rather that if these results prove intriguing, similar economic 
environments should be evaluated. 
In Mexico, the retail sector is changing as suppliers become more efficient and the 
competition adopts new business practices in an effort to keep up with Wal-Mart. 
Technological innovation and efficiency are signs of effective competition among 
business, yet it may also signify lost jobs.   It is possible that in the midst of this retail 
sector transformation jobs are being replaced with improved technology or jobs are being 
lost by those unable to compete with the Blue Giant. One may ask if increased 
competition and modernization can be considered negative externalities. The question is 
less whether or not competition and modernization are good for business, but rather if 
competition is possible for everyone within this sector.  Furthermore, if it is not possible, 
what exit options exist for the “losers”?  The lower prices reaped from competition may 
benefit the consumer but what if that competition destroys more jobs than it creates4?  If 
competition is to be sustained, then appropriate policies should be discussed to ensure 
that viable alternatives exist for those left behind.   
 Using regression analysis, this study seeks to determine the relationship between 
Wal-Mart’s presence and retail jobs. Before discussing the results, it is important that 
“the Wal-Mart Effect” be contextualized.  The remaining portion of the introduction is 
                                                
4 Jobs are “destroyed” when a retailer fails to create as many jobs as are lost.  Jobs are lost when smaller 
stores close or fire employees due to their inability to compete.   
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intended to review facets of the Wal-Mart debate and illustrate the level of the retailer’s 
presence in the U.S. and Mexico.  These examples will conclude with a justification for 
choosing to target the Blue Giant when other big-box stores and multinational 
corporations are present in Mexican retail5. 
Section two of the thesis will include a discussion of globalization and the 
common externalities associated with this process, focusing briefly on culture and 
agriculture.  That will be followed by a brief summary of the state of Mexico before and 
after NAFTA, and will conclude with an overview of the Latin American Supermarket 
Trend and its effect on small/medium farmers.  Section three will outline the structure of 
the Mexican retail sector, followed by a review of Wal-Mart’s history in Mexico, and will 
end with an overview of the competition.  The fourth section will introduce the variables 
of the regression model followed by the results of the statistical estimations.  Finally, the 
fifth section will offer an interpretation of the regression results and discuss further study 
options.   
 
Wal-Mart in the United States 
Critics of Wal-Mart are abundant; in addition to anti-Wal-Mart website 
campaigns6, academic studies are increasing.  The following examples discuss the 
retailer’s effect on small-town sales, family-poverty rates, and state safety net programs.  
This subsection concludes with an anecdotal look at Wal-Mart’s relationship with various 
                                                
5 Examples include Soriana, Gigante, Comercial Mexicana, and Costco. 
6 Sites include WalMartMovie.com, WalMartWatch.com, and WakeUpWalMart.com.  Interestingly, 
“googling” the phrase “anti-Wal-Mart” results in 135,000 sites, while “pro-Wal-Mart” yields only 21,600 
results.     
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suppliers.  The examples provided are generally negative as the purpose is to illustrate the 
various criticisms hurled at the retailer. 
Kenneth Stone, an economics professor at Iowa State University conducted a 
study to determine the impact of Wal-Mart’s presence on small-town Iowa retailers.  
Comparing towns with Wal-Mart and those without, Stone concludes “that some small 
towns lose up to 47 percent of the retail trade after 10 years of Wal-Mart stores nearby” 
(Stone, 1997: 2).  He notes that Wal-Mart is one of several “category-killers” among 
names such as Toys R Us, Home Depot and Staples; a “category-killer” “enter(s) a 
category with so much buying power that they almost instantly kill the smaller 
competitors (footnote excluded)” (Klein, 2000: 134).  Wal-Mart belongs to a larger group 
of “category-killers” with the capacity and capital to destroy smaller establishments, but 
appears to be the target of choice for many. 
Wal-Mart’s effects are not limited to the retail sector but also affect state support 
systems; even taxpayers are vulnerable to Wal-Mart’s ways.  Research by the UC 
Berkeley Labor Center found that Wal-Mart employees in California “earn on average 31 
percent less than workers employed in large retail as a whole…In addition, 23 percent 
fewer Wal-Mart workers are covered by employer-sponsored health insurance” (Dube & 
Jacobs, 2004: 1).  The study estimates the cost incurred by California’s state safety net 
programs as a result of the lower wages and benefits provided by the retailer.  The 
conclusion: taxpayers in California spend $86 million on Wal-Mart workers enrolled in 
safety net programs—$32 million in health-related costs and $54 million in other costs.  
If similarly-sized Californian retailers were to follow suit, it would amount to an 
additional $410 million.  “In effect”, the authors argue, “Wal-Mart is shifting part of its 
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labor costs onto the public” and policy makers should consider the cost of these jobs 
when pursuing economic development (Dube & Jacobs, 2004: 8).   
Poverty rates have also been affected by Wal-Mart’s presence.  Goetz and 
Swaminathan conducted a county-level study that isolates the retailer’s effects on family-
poverty rates, and found that “the presence of Wal-Mart was unequivocally associated 
with smaller reductions in family-poverty rates in U.S. counties during the 1990s relative 
to places that had no stores” (Goetz & Swaminathan, 2006: 223).  Additional tests 
revealed that Wal-Mart store growth in the 1990s is correlated with increases in or 
smaller decreases in food stamp usage per capita.   
The authors discuss the externalities associated with Wal-Mart’s entrance into a 
community, for example, the displacement of “mom and pop shops”.  It is possible that 
the owners and employees of these stores may find positions at a Wal-Mart, however 
they may work for lower wages and fewer hours.  One can argue that these workers can 
take jobs elsewhere7, yet the authors note that “(a)lthough individual workers have the 
option of working or not working for Wal-Mart, a public policy issue arises if the chain 
creates externalities that raise poverty levels in the community” (Goetz & Swaminathan, 
2006: 214).  
This displacement affects more than the “moms and pops” but also those 
businesses that supplied services to their stores, such as wholesalers, product transporters, 
and financial providers.  As Wal-Mart relies on its headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas 
for logistical support, those suppliers are no longer needed.  This effect may contribute to 
a “brain drain” of sorts in which these business-people move to urban areas where their 
                                                
7 This argument rests on the assumption that exit options other than Wal-Mart exist, or that the employees 
can afford the cost of moving if opportunities exist outside of the community. 
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services may be useful.  Wal-Mart’s effects, and those of other mass merchandisers such 
as the aforementioned “category-killers”, can reach beyond the retail sector. 
A final popular topic is Wal-Mart’s relationship with its suppliers, and arguably, 
there are positive and negative effects when evaluating these relationships8.  A positive 
effect: its volume and delivery requirements demand efficient production practices and 
precise delivery times, and this is achieved through effective computer systems.  For 
American blue jeans company Levi Strauss, “(g)etting ready for Wal-Mart has been like 
putting Levi on the Atkins diet” (Fishman, 2003: 8).  Prior to their relationship9, Levi 
Strauss was known industry-wide for late delivery times.  Post-Blue Giant, the company 
has updated its technology and delivers on time and more frequently10.  Arguably, 
meeting Wal-Mart’s demands may improve the supplier’s relationship with other buyers. 
Additionally, suppliers that achieve the necessary efficiency have access to a 
company that “sells in three months what number-two retailer Home Depot sells in a 
year…(that) does more business than Target, Sears, Kmart, J.C. Penney, Safeway and 
Kroger combined” (Fishman, 2003: 1).  However, increased sales may not guarantee 
higher profits.  America’s number one pickle brand, Vlasic, saw higher sales and growth 
numbers after the launch of its gallon-sized jar of pickles priced at a mere $2.97; it also 
lost millions of dollars as its profits fell by 25 percent.  Fearful of the future, a former 
Vlasic vice president, Steve Young, fought with Wal-Mart for a price increase.  Young 
remembers the words of one Wal-Mart executive, “He said, ‘Well, we’ve done to pickles 
                                                
8 Characterizations of Wal-Mart’s relationship with its suppliers as well as the stories of suppliers were 
extracted from Fishman (2003).   
9 Levi Strauss and Wal-Mart began their partnership in October 2002; Wal-Mart sells Levi’s Signature 
brand blue jeans.  
10 Fishman also notes that Levi Strauss lowered their quality standards in this process.   
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what we did to orange juice.  We’ve killed it.  We can back off.’” (Fishman, 2003: 3).  
Wal-Mart finally reduced the gallon-sized jar to a little over half a gallon priced at $2.79.   
The Lovable Company11 began doing business with the retailer in the “early 
days”; Wal-Mart eventually became its biggest client and, ultimately, controlled the 
company’s fate.  Frank Garson II, grandson of Lovable’s founder, said “They had 
awarded us a contract, and in their wisdom, they changed the terms so dramatically that 
they really reneged…They leave a lot to be desired in the way they treat people…Wal-
Mart chewed us up and spit us out” (Fishman, 2003: 6).  Three years later, in 1998, the 
company closed its doors after 72 years of business.   
 
Wal-Mart in Mexico 
 Studies have not yet been conducted of the same scale in Mexico as in the United 
States, and so the stage must be set using anecdotes and opinions from various newspaper 
articles.  Tim Weiner writes that Wal-Mart is changing the Mexican retail sector as it did 
in the U.S. “and with the same formula: cut prices relentlessly, pump up productivity, pay 
low wages, ban unions, give suppliers the tightest possible profit margins and sell 
everything under the sun for less than the guy next door” (Weiner, 2003: 1).  This 
“formula” is the Wal-Mart business model and the competition in Mexico has taken 
notice.  Ken Bensinger notes that other “big-box” chains are doing what they can to set 
themselves apart such as offering higher-end products, specialty goods, and traditional 
Mexican fare (Bensinger, 2005).   
                                                
11 Lovable supplied retail chains such as Wal-Mart, Sears, and Victoria’s Secret with bras and lingerie.   
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 The retailer also faces criticism from those concerned with the “cultural 
imperialism” often associated with the entrance of foreign firms.  Weiner writes that in 
Mexico “a new consumer culture is rising, along with the sales of McDonald’s 
hamburgers and Domino’s pizzas” (Weiner, 2003: 1).  Wal-Mart’s American roots may 
only add salt to the wound as, historically, Mexico’s relationship with its northern 
neighbor may be best described by the phrase “can’t live with ‘em, can’t live without 
‘em”.   
The retailer’s decision to build near the Pyramids in Teotihuacán sparked a battle 
within the Mexican community.  The Pyramids of the Sun and the Moon are located in 
the historic “City of the Gods” in San Juan Teotihuacán.  In an article titled Wal-Mart 
Invades Mexico, John Ross notes that some citizens looked forward to Wal-Mart’s lower 
prices and cleaner facilities compared with local shops, while another expressed anger at 
the Wal-Mart “conquest”.  Yet despite the battle, the retailer was doing booming business 
only one month after opening its doors (Ross, 2005).  Apparently, consumers gave up 
their fight against cultural imperialism and corporate bullying for a wider selection at 
lower prices, or perhaps, the concerned were also the minority.   
 
Why Wal-Mart? 
 Hopefully the previous accounts have successfully demonstrated Wal-Mart’s 
influence.  However, those familiar with Mexican retail know that the Blue Giant is not 
the only big-box supermarket in town, so why Wal-Mart?  The argument is that this 
retailer is leading the supermarket charge, increasing competition and modernizing 
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business practices, and therefore it justly serves as a representative of the 
“supermarketization” of Mexico.   
Naomi Klein discusses the danger of missing the forest for the tree in No Logo.  
Using opinions from various sources, including historical preservationist and Wal-Mart 
enemy, John Jarvis, and quotations from Bob Ortega’s In Sam We Trust, Klein addresses 
the dangers of choosing one “big tree”.  Jarvis notes that “the good thing about Wal-Mart 
was that it was big enough, nasty enough, and aggressive enough to make the problem of 
uncontrolled growth clear (footnote excluded)” (Klein, 2000: 422)12. However, Ortega 
warns that Wal-Mart critics spend too much energy fighting the Blue Giant and 
effectively ignore the copy-cats; “(t)o the extent that Wal-Mart’s critics blast it for wiping 
out Main Street businesses, for homogenizing communities, for trying to crush any and 
all rivals, for selling goods made in sweatshops here and abroad, they are missing the 
forest for the biggest tree (footnote excluded)” (Klein, 2000: 423).   
Klein explains, however, that the study of a single corporation can yield concrete 
examples of successes or failures that may also be characteristic of its peers.  Focusing on 
one company is also more manageable, and robust findings will warrant the addition of 
more “trees” to see if statistical trends hold across corporations.  Therefore, this paper 
will not claim that the nature of Wal-Mart’s relationship with retail sector employment is 
better or worse than that of the competition, but rather that it may be characteristic of the 
competition.  Wal-Mart is the world’s largest retailer and its visibility and domination 
make it an attractive target.   
 
                                                
12 This discussion uses quotes from Klein’s No Logo that are extracted from Ortega’s In Sam We Trust (pp. 
317 & xv, respectively).   
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Section 2: 
 
Globalization, NAFTA, & the Supermarket Trend 
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Globalization 
 
 The purpose of this section on globalization, NAFTA, and the supermarket trend 
is not to debate the pros and cons of the phenomena but rather to evaluate their negative 
externalities.  The argument is not that globalization and NAFTA are bad and must be 
stopped, but rather that they produce negative outcomes that must be recognized and 
therefore, appropriate policy measures must be discussed.  The process of international 
economic integration is a reality and often takes the form of free trade agreements with 
the subsequent spread of multinational corporations.  With this integration often comes 
unanticipated positive and negative effects, and it is the latter that will be outlined.   
Globalization has a variety of forms such as cultural globalization and 
communications, but this paper is concerned solely with economic globalization which: 
 “constitutes integration of national economies into the international economy 
through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), 
short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, 
and flows of technology” (Bhagwati, 2004: 1).   
The process of entering the global economic market may result in a variety of 
outcomes: increased competition, more jobs, and technological advance.  Labeling this 
process as positive or negative is often quickly done, at times without an honest effort at 
objectively evaluating the results (Bhagwati, 2004).  Regardless of one’s opinion on this 
process, the reality is that it is taking place; Mexico will not renege on NAFTA and revert 
to protectionist policies, so instead of fighting this process, it is necessary to understand it 
thoroughly, and develop strategies for dealing with the negative externalities.  
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 Thankfully, Dani Rodrik has done well in presenting what this opening of markets 
is and what is does13.  The challenge: “that international economic integration does not 
contribute to domestic disintegration” (Rodrik, 1997: 2).  This disintegration is caused by 
the social tensions that arise from the effects of market competition.  Causes of these 
tensions include the worker’s loss of bargaining power and an increase in nonwage costs 
shifted to the worker.  When corporations are able to cross international borders and 
when that change proves cheaper to the bottom line, many jobs, primarily low-skill 
become more “elastic”, that is, “trade increases the degree to which employment can 
react to changes in prevailing wages by outsourcing or investing abroad” (Rodrik, 1997: 
12,13).   
In developed countries, two changes are occurring on the demand curve for low-
skilled labor: an inward shift and a flattening of the curve (Rodrik, 1997: 12).  The 
inward shift occurs as low-skill jobs are being displaced by cheap imports from lesser 
developed countries. The flattening of the curve is due to increased uncertainty for low-
skill workers as their jobs may be displaced by workers in other countries; workers also 
bear more of the nonwage costs of the job including benefits.  The “substitutability” of 
their jobs results in lost bargaining power when negotiating wages, benefits, and hours.   
Additional sources of tension include the difficulty that governments face in 
providing social insurance to protect their citizens.  The opening of trade flows coupled 
with a reduction in social spending likens globalization to an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) austerity program14. Rodrik presents an interesting chapter on the shift from 
                                                
13 This globalization section draws heavily on Rodrik’s explanations and examples in Has Globalization 
Gone to Far?. 
14 It should be noted that studies have been conducted which find that social spending is not reduced under 
IMF programs (Martin & Segura-Ubiergo, 2004).   
 18
the post-war welfare state in which governments cushioned the effects of reducing trade 
barriers with social provisions, to an era where opening trade and the shrinking 
government are a packaged deal15. 
Finally, “trade becomes contentious when it unleashes forces that undermine the 
norms implicit in domestic practices” (Rodrik, 1997: 5).  Rodrik uses the example of a 
child labor in a lesser-developed country (LDC) displacing working adults in America.  
The American reaction may be one of righteous indignation, while jobs of any sort may 
be considered progress in the LDC.  The issue is determining whether the American 
worker is truly concerned for the children or if the “concern” is actually a hidden 
protectionist desire.   
Rodrik argues that unsettling distributional outcomes, in and of themselves, do 
not serve as a proper justifications for protectionist policies.  Consider technological 
advance, would it be appropriate to trade light bulbs for candles simply because making 
candles requires more manpower than manufacturing light bulbs?  Although the reality of 
child labor is more disturbing than the thought of unemployed candle-makers both are 
examples of unsettling outcomes.  Often, the answer lies in the legitimacy of the 
outcome, and the legitimacy of the outcome may hinge on its means; was the 
“distributional advantage obtained through means that society considers legitimate?” 
(Rodrik, 1997: 31)16.   
                                                
15 Academics disagree about the impact of openness on social spending, and some of the debate depends on 
one’s measure of openness (Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001and Avelino, Brown, & Hunter, 2005). 
Rodrik (1997) illustrates the varying outcomes that can be found when measuring trade openness versus 
external risk.  
16 For a thorough discussion of a society’s stance toward child labor see The Child and the State in India: 
Chid Labor and Education Policy in Comparative Perspective (Weiner, 1991).  A society’s view on child 
labor may be related to its economic, industrial, and educational development. 
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However, the legitimate means argument does not provide food for the 
unemployed candle-makers, yet arguably, light bulbs should not be banned.  The question 
becomes what opportunities exist for the displaced candle-maker or the low-skill worker?  
If the processes of technological advance and globalization are to be maintained and 
social disintegration avoided, an evaluation of a society’s alternatives and exit options 
must occur. 
 While social disintegration must be actively avoided, restricting free trade alone 
will not provide an effective solution just as protectionist policies alone do not solve 
societal ills.  Balancing domestic social needs and international economic integration is 
not a miracle cure, but rather an attractive alternative.  It is imperative that policy makers 
are not satisfied with economic growth that exacerbates inequality, but shift their desire 
to raising the bar for the lowest level of society.   
 
 
Globalization & Culture 
 
A group smuggling illegal workers to the United States dropped their “clients” off 
in front of a mall home to, among additional stores, a Wendy’s, an Appleby’s, and 
a Wal-Mart, telling the workers that they were now on “the Other Side”.  In 
reality, they were in Chihuahua a city 100 miles south of the U.S./Mexican border 
(Ross, 2003: 1). 
  
Economic globalization and cultural globalization are two different processes, but 
the social disintegration outlined by Rodrik may include cultural components.  The 
relationship between the two is well-defined by Néstor García Canclini: 
 “(Globalization) exacerbates international competition and undermines 
endogenous cultural production, favours the expansion of companies with the 
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capacity to homogenize and deal with sectoral and regional diversities in a 
particular way: It destroys or weakens inefficient producers, and presents 
peripheral cultures with the choice of remaining fixed within their local traditions, 
or exporting themselves…to the demands of transnational communications 
companies.” (Canclini, 2000: 45)   
The fear is that multinationals will enter with their brands and products and 
dominate domestic goods, create trends, and transform consumer tastes.  They may also 
transform the landscape as evident in the story above.  This idea of “cultural imperialism” 
is forefront when discussing Wal-Mart’s role in Mexico.  Is the “Wal-Martization” of 
retail leading to the  “Americanization” of Mexican tastes and purchasing trends?  
Francisco Rivero, an economic analyst in Mexico states that “(p)art of globalization is 
adopting the methods and customs of another country” and NAFTA negotiator Luis de 
Valle “proudly boasted” that “Mexicans and Americans now buy the same products and 
pay the same prices” (Weiner, 2003: 1 & Ross, 2005: 1, respectively).  Quotes such as 
this coupled with persuasive, well-written arguments such as Canclini’s tend to 
strengthen the fear that globalization supports the displacement of culture.     
Recall the account of Wal-Mart building near the Pyramids in Teotihuacán.  
Characterized by one as “an invasion, a new conquest”, concerns ranged from the 
desecration of a sacred site to the economic fallout for the local shops nearby (Ross, 
2005: 3).  I found cultural concerns tempered by my own experience at the pyramids.  
Fortunately, I visited before the Blue Giant was visible when standing atop the pyramid, 
but I distinctly remember being badgered by local businessmen and women to buy their 
Mexican-wares. Interestingly, these same products were available in stands at the zócalo, 
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at the flee market in Acapulco, and in their next-door-neighbor’s stall.  Is it less offensive 
when the locals are hawking mass-produced goods?   
This experience did not erase my concern that Wal-Mart may transform retail 
tastes by offering homogenized goods, perhaps steering consumers away from locally 
produced/grown products.  It did put into perspective the blame that may be assigned to 
large corporations doing business juxtaposed with the justifications assigned to local shop 
owners just “trying to make a living”.  This issue is muddied further by the reality that 
consumers are not being forced17 to eat McDonald’s or Domino’s or buy their groceries 
at a Sam’s Club, and those certainly are not the sole establishments to procure food and 
goods.  While I tend to be wary of the possible effects on culture, I also recognize that 
unless consumers lack choices altogether, they are responsible for their support of the 
multinational corporations.  
  
 
Globalization & Agriculture 
  
 The effects of reduced government support and trade barriers are also seen in the 
agricultural sector of Mexico.  Those in the countryside are being introduced to “new 
forms of agricultural finance, production, marketing, and processing that challenge the 
long-standing patterns of their economy and society” (Myhre, 1994: 145).  What is 
necessary for these peasant farmers to compete and survive?  Historically, politicians 
garnered support from the countryside using land redistribution and government 
subsidies, and while these measures were not always effective, the “rhetoric” of support 
                                                
17 Being “forced” to eat and shop at these establishments would occur only if no other viable alternatives 
existed, which is not the case.  
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was constant18.  The 1980s ushered in a new era, the rhetoric took on a neoliberal tone, 
and politicians encouraged competition while simultaneously yanking away the support 
system.  Reduced oil prices, high debt, and capital flight resulted in the 1980s financial 
crises.  In the midst of these crises, Mexico could no longer make debt payments, and the 
IMF demanded austerity measures: open the economy, reduce government social support. 
 Myhre examines how the politics of this process altered the agricultural credit 
system.  It is the credit systems that provided the loans—the means necessary for 
peasants to actively pursue competition19.  A group of small farmers, or campesinos, 
began the process of distancing themselves from state control before it was forced by 
President Salinas in the late 1980s.  In 1985, the National Union of Autonomous 
Regional Campesinos Organizations (UNORCA) formed one of the largest campesino 
collectives.  Its motive was to develop the countryside economy by working on policy 
issues that encouraged gaining independence from the state, rather than issuing demands 
for land redistribution.  The problem was their need for state cooperation at the same time 
the state was intent on achieving separation.  The result was a rather complicated 
dynamic as UNORCA needed help from the shrinking government in order to become 
independent from that very government.   
 State involvement was useful in negotiating with credit unions and arguably 
imperative after Salinas “generally reduced state outlays for investments in rural 
infrastructure, severely cut subsidies on most commodities, and curtailed lending” 
(Myhre, 1994: 155).  This resulted in drastically reduced output and stricter loan 
requirements from the official lending institution, Banrural.  While reductions were 
                                                
18 Historical facts and characterizations throughout the paper are based on information from Skidmore & 
Smith (2001). 
19 The facts on globalization and agriculture are supplied by Myhre (1994).    
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accompanied by Salinas’ desire that alternative credit unions support the system, the 
reality of dealing with these financial regulatory bodies proved frustrating for UNORCA.   
 These financial institutions were dealing with their own set of frustrations and 
challenges associated with the privatization of nationalized companies and attempts to be 
competitive in an increasingly global financial system.  It is likely that the absence of 
these realities may not have made these bodies more sympathetic to the rural plight, but 
their presence was exacerbating the problem.  The financial institutions were unwilling to 
recognize that these campesino credit unions were not financially “sophisticated” and 
lacked the knowledge to deal with the institutions’ bureaucracy.   
 Myhre argues that reverting back to protectionist policies and governmental 
control in the countryside was not the solution, but that instead there needed to be 
cooperation between state agencies, financial regulatory bodies, and campesino credit 
unions.  The credit unions’ limited understanding of financial matters should be 
recognized and standards and regulations should be adjusted accordingly.  A willingness 
to learn and to foster competitiveness was being undermined by the unrealistic 
expectations of the financial institutions and the limited support of the government.  The 
speed of Salinas’ reforms was also an obstacle; though the campesinos desired to achieve 
what the President was asking, “the neoliberal ideology exacerbated the impact of 
globalization…because of the state’s decision to act abruptly” (Myhre, 1994: 165).  It 
was unrealistic to expect a segment of society controlled by others (the state, wealthy 
landowners, etc.) for hundreds of years to become competitive immediately in a globally 
competitive market while learning to be independent from their government.  
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Understanding complicated trade agreements, achieving competitiveness, and grasping 
financial requirements requires more than the state wanting it to happen.   
 It is important to note that the struggles of these farmers are representative of the 
struggles of actors in other sectors, particularly those that are less-educated.  While each 
sector will face its own unique set of challenges, the effects of the liberalizations and the 
speed of these reforms will impact the economy as a whole. For example, in the retail 
sector, the comparative advantage lies with the organized, financially sophisticated 
multinationals and not, the minimally-educated family-shop owner20.   
  
 
NAFTA 
 
Before 
 
Salinas’s aforementioned decision to act quickly likely originated after a less than 
enthusiastic response from investors at the World Economic Forum in 199021.  Following 
the debt crisis in the 1980s, foreign investment was viewed as the as the best option22.   
During the 1970s, “Mexico gambled that the price of oil would remain high and interest 
rates would remain low” (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 56).  The bet was lost and Mexico 
endured a recession in 1981-82 when a reduced demand for oil led to decreased prices 
resulting in declining oil export revenue; this loss was accompanied by increased interest 
rates which raised Mexico’s debt.  Unable to pay the loans, Mexico succumbed to the 
demands of the IMF and embraced a structural adjustment program; the austerity 
measures included reduced state spending and higher taxes.  President Miguel de la 
                                                
20 This factor will be discussed further in section three. 
21 The World Economic Forum is annual gathering of the world’s leading executives, government leaders 
and officials, and non-governmental leaders; these leaders discuss various topics including, business 
strategies, the economy, and war (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000).   
22 The NAFTA section is drawn extensively from Cameron & Tomlin (2000). 
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Madrid Hurtado (1982-88) with his secretary of planning and budget, Salinas, initiated 
the opening of the Mexican economy.   
Salinas continued the process of liberalization upon assuming the presidency in 
1988, yet, initially, this meant liberalization policies not a trade agreement with the U.S.; 
“‘I am not in favor of such a proposal,’ (Salinas) said (in 1988)… ‘There is such a 
different economic level between the Unites States and Mexico that I don’t believe such a 
common market would provide an advantage to either country’” (Cameron & Tomlin, 
2000: 59).  Apparently, the investors’ lack of enthusiasm for Mexico changed his mind, 
and talks with the U.S. began in early 1990.  As for domestic support, “the level of 
domestic opposition was sharply reduced by the perception that all of these reforms were 
necessary and beneficial within the larger context of the inclusion of Mexico in the First 
World via the negotiation of NAFTA” (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 232)23.   
 
The Document 
   So what is NAFTA and what was it meant to accomplish?  The agreement itself 
is a commitment to economic integration between Mexico, the United States, and Canada 
that reduces trade barriers and tariffs and relaxes foreign investment requirements.  The 
NAFTA document consists of 22 chapters and discusses trade in energy, agriculture, and 
investment, among other sectors.  Goods gaining duty-free status include those “that are 
wholly obtained or produced in North America…(and) (g)oods containing non-North 
American content (which are) ‘substantially transformed’ through further processing in a 
                                                
23 NAFTA also led to the “reform of Mexico’s traditional land-tenure system” and a “new system of 
intellectual property rules” (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 232). 
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NAFTA country” (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 36)24.  Some products became duty-free 
immediately, while other reductions extend over a 5, 10, or 15 year period, for example, 
sensitive agricultural products such as corn and beans.  NAFTA encourages foreign 
investment with the promise of fair treatment that meets national standards, for example, 
in the service sector, “(n)ational treatment and most-favored-nation principles (extend) to 
all service providers except those identified as not covered (and) (p)rohibits residency 
requirements” (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 42)25.     
 For Mexico, “Salinas’s NAFTA initiative was the culmination of (a) strategy” that 
included making the economy more efficient and gaining access to technology and 
international markets though FDI (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 226).  Skidmore and Smith 
note that Mexico hoped that NAFTA would accomplish four things: attract FDI, leading 
to job creation and therefore, reduced social tensions; institutionalize Salinas’s economic 
liberalizations; garner “international benediction for its not-quite-democratic political 
regime”; and position Mexico as “a ‘bridge’ between the developing world and the 
developed world” (Skidmore & Smith, 2001: 253, 254).   
 
After 
 Did this agreement live up to Mexico’s expectations by attracting investors, 
reducing social tensions, and integrating markets?  The day that NAFTA went into effect, 
Mexico’s Zapatista guerilla movement began protesting the neoliberal policies.  This 
uprising was followed by the assassination of the PRI’s next-in-line for the presidency, 
                                                
24 Goods must be 60 percent North American made, excluding automobiles which must be 62.5 percent 
North American made.   
25 This sector includes, for example, credit card companies such as American Express.   
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Luis Donaldo Colosio, scandal26 in the administration of Salinas’s second-pick 
predecessor, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, and a second assassination within 
the PRI27.  Political and economic instability led to capital flight which threw Mexico 
into an economic crisis with the possibility of loan default.  Additionally, having 
previously assured investors that a peso devaluation would be unnecessary, the 
administration issued a devaluation in December 1994.  “Thus began the financial crisis 
that would leave many Mexicans feeling that just at the moment that NAFTA had opened 
a door to the potential for First World status, they had been shoved back into the Third 
World” (Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 218). 
Rescuing Mexico from loan default, President Clinton offered an aid package 
valued at $50 billion.  Following this economic crisis, the attention grabbing Zapatista 
National Liberation Army (EZLN) and a civil war in the ruling party, the PRI, “for the 
first time in its history…lost control of the national Chamber of Deputies—taking just 
238 out of 500 seats” (Skidmore & Smith, 2001: 256)28.   
 The irony is thick; NAFTA was hoped to ease social tensions and make Mexico 
attractive to foreign investors, yet it appeared the country would implode. Of course, the 
treaty was not expected to solve societal ills immediately, but neither was it touted, at 
least by the politicians proffering it, as the means to greater tension29.  Mexico’s 
“vulnerability to external shocks” was evident during 1994, and not even the trade 
                                                
26 Salinas criticized Zedillo for the mishandling of the 1994 peso devaluation, and Zedillo responded by 
launching an investigation into the murder of a prominent PRI “family” member.  Salinas’s brother was a 
prime suspect, and Zedillo appointed a member of the PAN as the attorney general. 
27 The “family” member was José Francisco Ruiz Massieu; the Ruiz Massieu family was influential in the 
PRI and had connections with the Salinas family. 
28 In fact, the PRI lost the presidency in 2000 with the election of PAN candidate, Vicente Fox. 
29The results and conclusion sections of this paper will show that Mexico still struggles with unemployment 
and low wages.    
 28
liberalizations of NAFTA were able to prevent capital flight in the presence of instability 
(Cameron & Tomlin, 2000: 212).   
Mexico is a prime example of a country that must balance domestic needs and 
economic liberalizations.  The outcomes of historical protectionism and the outcomes of 
two decades of neoliberal economic policy both included economic instability, labor 
surpluses, increasing inequality, and insufficient market integration.  Yes, the argument 
can be made (in either case) that history also included a colonial period, multiple wars, a 
politicized military, and a nosy northern neighbor, which all certainly played a role in 
Mexico’s instability.  However, what country lives in a vacuum?  None; there will always 
be alternative explanations for why free trade is not working or why protectionist policies 
alone are ineffective, the reality is that the singular pursuit of either path, for certain in 
Mexico’s case, is not the correct strategy.  
  
The Supermarket Trend 
 
Wal-Mart’s entrance into Mexico did not ignite the supermarket trend, but it does 
provide a concrete example of the recent “supermarketization” of Latin America.  
“Supermarkets’ share in retailing has quadrupled in Latin America”; they “have moved 
from a population-weighted average of 10-20% in 1990 to 50-60% of the retail sector in 
2000” (Reardon et al., 2002: 1).  This trend was driven by rapid urbanization, entry of 
women into the workforce resulting in an increased demand for easy shopping and quick 
meals, and increasing incomes (Reardon, 2004).  These “drivers” coupled with the 
aforementioned liberalization of trade and foreign investment served as a welcome mat 
for foreign supermarket players (Schwentesius and Gómez, 2002).  The effects of this 
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trend were witnessed throughout Latin America, and arguably, it is the smaller stores and 
public markets which lose the most (Reardon et al., 2002).   
Schwentesius and Gómez offer 5 distinct categories amongst food retailers that 
aid in distinguishing between modern supermarkets and traditional specialty shops and 
public markets: 
1. Open-air, public markets, generally in city centers and managed by city governments – 
the retailers sell from small stalls 
2. Mobile street markets (tianguis) that change location from day to day (similar to the 
ferias libres in Chile or the ferias livres in Brazil) – communities and city 
neighbourhoods typically have a day of the week (‘plaza market day’) when the tianguis 
shows up and sells a variety of products similar to that of a supermarket, but usually of 
lower quality and at negotiable prices 
3.  Small traditional shops that sell a limited line of products, the types and quality 
depending on the incomes and tastes of the neighborhood – these shops have strong 
powers of survival and can adapt to changing tastes, and sell some of their product on 
credit 
4. Specialised shops (such as fruit shops) – these are of little importance in Mexico as 
consumers prefer to buy perishables from tianguis 
5. Self-service stores, including supermarkets and convenience stores 
(taken from Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002: 488) 
Schwentesius and Gómez also outline three phases in the rise of supermarkets in 
Mexico beginning in 1946 with the opening of the first supermarket. Lasting through the 
1970s, stage one was limited to larger northern and central cities and the authors note that 
the majority of the retailers’ capital was domestic.  Stores began branching out into 
additional cities, and phase two began in the 1980s as supermarket expansion led to 
increased competition among chains.  This competition was marked by “the acquisition 
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of a number of small chains”, new marketing techniques, and “alliances with both 
domestic and foreign capital” (Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002: 490).   The third phase, 
beginning in the 1990s, was initiated by the aforementioned liberalizations which led to 
an onslaught of FDI.  The FDI was aided by the “(abandonment of) the 49/51 formula 
that assured control by domestic capital” and Mexico welcomed fresh players including 
the U.S. and France (Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002: 490).  
 In Mexico, the economic liberalizations institutionalized with the ratification of 
NAFTA created an attractive environment for foreign supermarket chains, and Wal-Mart 
was among a handful of multinational corporations to take on the Mexican retail market.  
Carrefour and Auchan, both French self-service retailers, entered the market in 1994 and 
1997, respectively30. Inditex, a Spanish department store, arrived in 1992, and the 
American participants include: JCPenney, a department store, in 1995; HEB, a self-
service retailer, in 1997; and thirty years before Wal-Mart, 7-Eleven, a convenience store, 
made its entrance in 1971.  
 Clearly, Wal-Mart is not the sole participant in the supermarket trend, and in fact, 
has not even fared well in all of Latin American.  In both Brazil and Argentina, Wal-Mart 
has failed to dominate the market.  Its “every day low prices” slogan was nothing new in 
Brazil where other retailers had already employed this strategy, and in Argentina its 
problems were twofold as it made the mistake of catering to the higher classes during a 
recession and struggled to form relationships with local suppliers, the latter, Wal-Mart 
claims, being “due to pressure from other retailers” (Tilly, May 2005: 7).  Tilly also notes 
that the Blue Giant even had troubles in Mexico, in the northern city of Monterrey, where 
Soriana and HEB were already the established customer favorites.   
                                                
30 Information regarding foreign supermarket entrants is provided by Tilly (May 2005).   
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 Wal-Mart’s struggles notwithstanding, it has undeniably made its mark 
throughout Central and South America, and with stores in 9 Latin American countries, it 
does well in representing the supermarket trend.  On May 9, 2006, an on-line corporation 
update contained the following:  
“(I)n December, Wal-Mart announced the acquisition of 140 Sonae stores in 
Brazil, adding a variety of retail formats to the company's wide range of existing 
formats in the country…These developments follow the September announcement 
that Wal-Mart had purchased a one-third interest in Central American Retail 
Holding Co. (CARHCO) with 363 supermarkets and other stores in Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In March 2006, Wal-Mart 
increased its interest to 51% and the name CARHCO was changed to Wal-Mart 
Central America.” (Source: Wal-Mart on-line) 
The retailer is not the only big-box chain in Latin America, but it is increasing its 
presence, even in areas where it has previously faltered, and that makes this “tree” stand 
taller than the rest. 
  With the entrance of so many seasoned retailers, one would expect this 
supermarket trend to indicate trouble for the traditional “mom and pop shops” in Mexico, 
and some authors argue that it has or will (Reardon et al., 2002), yet “1990s expectations 
regarding supermarket growth and their ability to displace traditional retailing have not 
been met” (Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002: 491).  This fact actually makes the argument 
more intriguing, indicating that there are complex issues at hand.  Mexico has 
experienced the supermarket trend yet has not seen the decline of the traditional sector.  
How then has Wal-Mart added new stores and experienced increased sales annually 
(Wal-Mart on-line)?  Why did Wal-Mart survive and thrive, while some foreign retailers 
entering the market around the same time have sold their stores and left the country 
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(Tilly, May 2005)?  If the traditional sector has not suffered, then it follows that 
supermarkets would not be flourishing, yet both Wal-Mart and the competition are 
growing.  
It is possible that the supermarket trend is gaining speed in tandem with increased 
Mexican consumption.  Increased retail sales could account for the simultaneous growth 
of modern retail and the continued survival of traditional establishments. If this is true, 
with Mexico’s history of economic uncertainty and its recent growing inequality, is this 
type of growth sustainable? The apparent resiliency of the traditional sector may stand 
solid while supermarkets continue to grow, or it is possible that the years to come will 
result in a reduction of small stores.   
However, it could be that the traditional sector survives only due to a lack of exit 
options.  Aggregate retail sales, as will be evident in the data section, are not increasing; 
therefore as Wal-Mart increases its share of retail sales, the shares of other establishments 
are decreasing.  It is also possible that the “mom and pop shops” and public markets 
presently maintain a competitive edge in the sale of fresh fruits and vegetables.  
Supermarkets have not yet overtaken the small shop and street fair in being the place to 
buy produce, yet experts fear their domination is imminent.  Additionally, tianguis and 
other traditional shops have lower overhead costs as they are often family shops that 
“employ” family members a little or no cost, whereas supermarkets must compensate 
each employee.  A second advantage is that the size of the traditional outlets allows them 
to avoid taxes while large chain stores could not succeed in tax evasion.  It is these 
advantages that have perhaps have enabled smaller shops and markets to maintain their 
low prices, but supermarkets are making headway with changing business practices that 
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may swing the advantage their way.  Perhaps as this transformation takes place, the effect 
on the traditional sector will also be felt.  
 
Supermarket Trend & Agriculture 
Increasing academic attention is being paid to how the supermarket trend will 
affect small/medium farmers in Mexico and throughout Latin America.  These concerns 
are exacerbated by the conditions created by accelerating international economic 
integration and shrinking state support.  Much of the literature regarding supermarkets in 
Latin America appears to be “preemptively” developing a game plan to ensure the 
survival of small/medium farmers, more specifically, fruit and vegetable growers.  It is 
preemptive as supermarkets have not yet dominated the sales of fresh fruits and 
vegetables (FFV) as quickly as other products for reasons such as the cultural tradition of 
buying fresh daily, the abundance of street fairs in high foot-traffic areas, and the lower 
prices of small shops and fairs (Reardon et al., 2002).    However, the supermarkets are 
gaining ground; Reardon argues that they sell $12 billion of food annually, which is 50 
percent more than Mexico’s food exports, have become “a crucial internal market issue”, 
and “are three to five times more important at present to small/medium producers in 
Mexico than trade” (Reardon, 2004: 1).  
 As supermarkets procure more of the FFV market, it is important that 
small/medium growers are able to sell their products to these chains, but they face a 
variety of obstacles such as changes in procurement, the shift to preferred suppliers, and 
the transformation of safety and quality standards (outlined in Reardon et al., 2002 & 
Reardon, 2004).   
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Traditionally, FFV procurement takes place in wholesale markets; in Mexico 
these markets are called centrales de abastos (CA).  CAs are located in urban areas such 
as Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey; first, the suppliers transport their produce to 
the CA and then the supermarkets travel to the CA to procure the goods (Reardon, 2004).  
The switch from CAs to distribution centers (DC) occurs when the construction of a DC 
“is outweighed by the benefits of reduced coordination costs” (Reardon, 2004: 5).  The 
benefits arise due to increased bargaining power as the buyer is now dealing directly with 
the supplier—the CA “middle-man” is gone; the buyer is also able to purchase larger 
volumes of product and sheds the cost of transportation as the supplier is expected to 
transport the product to the DC.  While this switch does not occur immediately, once a 
supermarket has the capital to make the change, the benefits are great.    
 Small/medium farmers, on the other hand, must learn how to negotiate, as the 
loss of the CA middle-man puts them at a disadvantage.  They must also provide more 
frequent transport to DCs which may not be financially feasible.  Delivering to local 
shops does not entail long travel times, but the supplier bears the cost of transportation to 
the DC.  Additionally, FFV must maintain their quality during transfer to the DCs, and 
this requires refrigerated trucks, which is an additional expense.   
A second shift is from the spot market to preferred suppliers; preferred suppliers 
can be relied upon to deliver consistent, quality products, in the volumes required by 
supermarkets (Reardon, 2004).  Smaller producers may have difficulty in providing 
produce of the consistent quality and volume that supermarkets expect, and if they wish 
to become “preferred”, it is likely that a collective will need to be formed to fulfill 
volume and quality demands.  They also must be capable of promoting themselves or 
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their collective to the supermarket.  Large chain stores will not lack suitors, and if the 
small/medium growers wish to get the job, they must self-promote.   
While raising capital for transportation and learning how to self-promote 
effectively, small/medium growers must also meet the additional demands of the 
business.  Schwentesius and Gómez provide a useful list of supermarkets’ required 
standards and practices: 
 
• they require delivery in consistent volumes and quality (consistency in 
terms of colour and size); 
• they prefer deliveries to be of moderate volumes but continuous 
throughout the year; 
• they tolerate up to 10% of damaged produce; 
• they require refrigerated transport for the produce; 
• they prefer the product to be packed in cardboard boxes rather than loose; 
• they receive the produce only before noon; 
• they pay from 8 to 45 days after delivery – depending on the product; 
• they demand a discount to cover the supermarket’s putting the product on 
sale (promotion). 
(Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002: 494) 
These requirements likely reach beyond the scope of the small/medium farm if 
they lack access to organizational and financial support.  CAs provide immediate 
payment, while supermarket payment plans may be as long as 45 days, and that is 
assuming that the grower is able to meet every other standard.  This delayed 
compensation may be an adjustment that many cannot afford, especially when 
considering the aforementioned decline of governmental support and difficulty for rural 
credit unions to secure the capital to provide loans.  If these challenges can be overcome, 
the small farmer must also be willing to become “official” in the accounting sense and 
would lose the comparative advantage (to the extent that this is an advantage) of tax 
evasion. 
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“The scale of operations…is often not sufficient to offset the cost of such 
supermarket practices as delayed payments, high rates of rejected produce, and the 
occasional charging of shelf fees.  Finally, by contrast with traditional markets, 
working with supermarkets means having to adopt formal accounting and 
invoicing practices, and thus being unable to avoid paying taxes” (Reardon et al., 
2002: 4).   
 
 The problems are abundant as growers must acclimate themselves to a large set of 
new expectations, both agriculturally and financially.  The literature not only outlines 
existing problems but potential policy solutions geared toward farmers, governmental 
organizations, and policy makers.  Historically, land redistribution coupled with empty 
promises of social provisions resulted in lowered production and insufficient market 
integration indicating that this type of policy should be avoided31. 
Llambi discusses the issue of competition in the context of making nontraditional 
exports more marketable in an integrating economy, and his thoughts are comparable to 
the present domestic situation.  He encourages product diversification and experimenting 
in value-added industries; these do require the necessary capital and knowledge beyond 
what already exist, but organizations and collectives may be helpful (Llambi, 1994).  For 
example, the National Association of Credit Unions of the Social Sector (ANUCSS), 
which was established in 1990 by credit unions supported by UNORCA, is focused on 
dealing with financial institutions’ regulations and bureaucracy (Myhre, 1994).  If 
specialization is too much to tackle presently or growers are uninterested, ANUCSS may 
provide help in securing capital for transportation requirements or teaching farmers how 
to deal with changing payment plans. 
                                                
31 President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) redistributed 44 million acres of land to peasants, yet the decision 
to rely on a communal system (ejidos) coupled with inadequate governmental support resulted in decreased 
production and insufficient market integration.  Cárdenas was also responsible for the expropriation of 
firms from the U.S. and Britain (Skidmore & Smith, 2001).     
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The issue of self-promotion is also being addressed through the formation of 
agricultural groups. Cook notes that formally independent grower-shippers “have joined 
forces with competitors and are marketing jointly” though their operations remain 
separate (Cook, 2003: 5).  There are also examples of wholesalers that use small/medium 
growers to “make up gaps in product and periods” from other suppliers (Reardon, 2004).  
There was even an attempt to form a small growers’ union, The Union of Lime and 
Tropical Fruit Growers, and though this failed it serves as a useful case study for finding 
fixes for the problems faced by the lime growers, which will prove useful when future 
associations are formed (Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002).   
For the traditional sector it is imperative that modernization and development 
occur so that both farmers and shop owners are able to compete as supermarkets grow in 
popularity.  Presently, they maintain a comparative advantage in regards to FFV prices, 
but local shops and markets should anticipate a shift in FFV procurement and pricing and 
plan accordingly.   This may include “adjust(ing) to consumer preferences in terms not so 
much of product quality as of quality of services (cleanliness, safety, parking space, 
honest and transparency of weights and measures)” as supermarkets transform consumer 
shopping habits and tastes (Reardon et al., 2002: 5).    
The key for policy makers and organizations is to recognize issues regarding 
capacity, capital, business sense, and technology while remembering the importance of 
integrating small/medium farmers into this market (Reardon, 2004).  Additionally, exit 
options should be discussed for those farmers unable to compete; even assuming perfect 
cooperation between financial institutions, state agencies, rural credit unions, and even 
supermarkets, it is unrealistic to assume that every farmer will succeed.  It is imperative 
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that social provisions are discussed whether it be financial support or job training skills32. 
Small farmers are already situated in the lower echelons of society and cannot be 
expected to find alternatives to agriculture, in the event it is necessary, without some 
form of support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Of course, this measure assumes that jobs are available. 
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Retail Sector Structure 
 
The commercial sector in Mexico can be divided into two main divisions: 
mayoreo and menudeo, the former being “wholesale” and the latter “retail”.  This study 
focuses on menudeo, which is classified as those selling to the general public; conversely, 
mayoreo refers to those selling to large entities such as pharmacies or supermarket 
chains.  The retail division is further broken down into 13 categories: 
Tiendas de Abarrotes  = “mom and pop shops” 
Tiendas de discos, juguetes y regalos = record, toy and gift stores 
Tiendas de ropa y calzado  = clothing and shoe stores 
Mueblerías    = furniture stores 
Ferretería y tlapalería   = hardwares, paints, electronics  
Vehículos    = cars 
Refacciones para vehículos  = car repair shops 
Farmacias    = pharmacies 
Papelerías y librerías   = stationary and bookstores 
Gaseras    = cooking gas 
Estaciones de gasolina  = gas stations 
Tiendas departamentales  = department stores 
Supermercados   = supermarkets 
(Source: INEGI on-line33) 
The dependent variable of this study, the levels of the retail sector employment index, 
refers to the rate of employment for the entire sector.  The regression analysis, therefore, 
does not limit itself to determining Wal-Mart’s effects on supermarkets or tiendas de 
abarrotes (“mom and pop shops”) but on the employment index for all divisions within 
this sector.  
Gastelum and Ruiz describe additional retail categories: modern and traditional34.  
Stores are placed into a group based on the number of persons employed.  Two categories 
constitute modern retailers, grande and mediano; grande refers to establishments that 
                                                
33 English translations provided by Marcus Kurtz and the on-line dictionary of Real Academia Española at 
www.rae.org. 
34 Facts on Mexico’s retail sector structure are drawn extensively from Gastelum and Ruiz (2003). 
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consist of 50 or more workers while mediano establishments consist of 21 to 49 workers.  
Examples of modern retailers are department store and supermarkets.  The traditional 
sector includes the micro and pequeño stores that consist of 1 to 20 workers; tiendas de 
abarrotes are considered traditional35.  This category includes smaller grocers as well as 
family-owned shops that may be operated out of the home. 
The clientele and number of employees are not the only differences between 
modern and traditional retail.  Additional characteristics include the use of technology 
and the nature of the employee-customer relationship.  Modern retailers utilize 
technology to aid in organization, infrastructure, and product acquisition and distribution 
while traditional stores use little, if any, technology.  Modern retailers also tend to be 
self-service, while shopping at a traditional outlet will involve extensive employee-
customer interaction.  Additionally, traditional shops are often family-owned and may 
offer lines of credit and home delivery, while modern stores are often owned by 
corporations and require payment upon purchase.  The categories also differ in the types 
and amounts of goods offered.  While traditional stores are generally limited to basic 
necessities, the modern retailers stock a variety of items such as foodstuffs, home goods 
and electronics. 
Wal-Mart is considered a modern, self-service supermarket due to its size, 
number of employees, use of technology, and product variety.  As it is not limited to food 
products, its effect is not unique to food shops but may reach into all divisions of the 
retail sector.  Traditional food stores, clothing stores, and department stores, among 
others, are subject to the increased competition among rival modern units, and the 
information above illustrates the challenges faced by traditional shops.  Often those 
                                                
35 Traditional stores may be broken down further by size.   
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running the smaller shops are minimally educated and lack a thorough knowledge of the 
service sector making technological advances less attainable; others may lack the space to 
offer a larger variety of goods; and finally, innovation and competition are expensive and 
funds may be unavailable (Gastelum and Ruiz, 2003).  Mexico’s downward employment 
trend also limits exit options for unsuccessful retailers as will be discussed later.   
Competition and modernization are good for business, but one must be able to 
compete for this to hold true for their business.  As it stands now, meaningful competition 
is arguably limited to those within the modern retail division.  The traditional shops will 
remain the most affected but the least able to participate as they face financial and 
organizational limitations.  These “mom and pop shops” are also more vulnerable to sales 
uncertainties; if Wal-Mart faces decreased sales it can compensate with worker 
redundancies or scaled back expansion plans.  Smaller stores, however, may not have 
employees to fire and will have to “swallow” the losses by consuming less.  This appears 
to be a reality as Wal-Mart’s sales are increasing, but overall retail sector sales are not.  
The implications of this trend will be outlined shortly. 
Furthermore, modern retailers, such as supermarket chains, are not confined to 
one village or even state, therefore the profits from one store may not remain in that 
locality.   While it can be argued that the profits from traditional shops will likely be 
spent, saved, or invested locally, Wal-Mart’s profits may be moved to other stores in 
Mexico or perhaps leave the country entirely.  Therefore, the redistribution of sales from 
traditional to modern stores can impact individual “mom and pop shops” as well as the 
local economy as a whole. 
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Wal-Mart de México 
 
Founded by Spaniards, Cifra opened its first grocery store, Aurrera, in Mexico 
City in 1958, and in the following twelve years, Superama, Vips, Suburbia, and Bodega 
Aurrera stores were unveiled36.  In 1991, the U.S.-based Wal-Mart joined forces with 
Mexico’s leading retailer and opened its first store outside of the United States, a Sam’s 
Club located in the vicinity of Mexico City.  Wal-Mart Supercenter then opened its doors 
in 1993 and the following year, NAFTA went into effect.  The liberalization of foreign 
investment only made easier the Blue Giant’s transition in Mexico; Wal-Mart obtained a 
majority stake in Cifra in 1997, and today boasts 783 stores37 in 109 cities.  The retailer’s 
growth has been steady as the number of average Wal-Mart stores per federal entity, or 
state, has increased annually (see Graph 1) .  Wal-Mart de México, or Walmex, as it is 
also called, is Mexico’s largest private employer with over 100,000 employees 
countrywide and is dominating the commercial retail sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Facts on Wal-Mart and the competition are drawn from both Wal-Mart on-line sources and Tilly (May 
2005 & Sept. 2005).   
37 This total includes department store and restaurant formats.  The 2005 Annual Report listed the total 
number of stores at 783, 432 of which were self-service stores. 
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Wal-Mart's Growing Influence in Mexico
 
The retailer operates six different formats in Mexico: Wal-Mart Supercenter, 
Sam’s Club, Superama, and Bodega Aurrera, Suburbia and Vips: Wal-Mart is a self-
service “supercenter” that offers a wide variety of goods including foodstuffs, clothing, 
electronics, home goods, toiletries and more; Sam’s Club is a self-service wholesale club 
requiring a membership; Superama is a self-service grocery store found in residential 
areas; the final self-service format is Bodega Aurrera, a discount store that offers 
groceries, home and staple goods; Suburbia is the sole department store format, selling 
apparel aimed at the middle-class; and the restaurant division includes Vips and El 
Porton.      
Wal-Mart not only exported its Supercenters and its Sam’s Clubs but its business 
model as well.  Low prices, cutting-edge technology, efficient product acquisition and 
distribution, and aggressive price comparison have made the Blue Giant the world’s 
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leading retailer.  Love it or hate it, the business model proven effective in the United 
States has been successfully exported to Mexico.    
As in the U.S., the company uses its “every day low prices” (EDLP) slogan to 
gain consumer confidence and loyalty—why take time to shop for bargains if the 
cheapest products are all under one roof?  Offering the lowest prices requires its own 
business strategy, and the Blue Giant has the buying power to purchase large volumes of 
product resulting in deep discounts from the supplier (think pickles).  The retailer then 
passes on these savings to the consumer and EDLP becomes gospel.  What is the 
downside?  The consumer buys what he/she wants at the lowest possible price, Wal-
Mart’s sales increase, and the supplier sells massive amounts of product to the world’s 
leading retailer.   
The critics, ranging from academics and journalists to union members and 
activists of all types, argue that Wal-Mart couples bullying with its buying power.   An 
unnamed clothing manufacturer executive in Mexico comments: 
 “Wal-Mart has driven many suppliers out of business.   Wal-Mart maintains its 
profit margin…They never reduce their margin.  They do pass on savings in price, 
but at the expense of the manufacturer…(T)hey may tell you, ‘We’re going to sell 
shirts at a discount of 40 percent—you the manufacturer, have to cut your price 40 
percent’.  So the consumer benefits, but they’re driving out of business the 
manufacturers that provide jobs.” (Tilly, May 2005: 5) 
Yet the argument may be made that the supplier has the right to cut off their relationship 
with Wal-Mart if, in fact, it feels pressured.  Regardless of opinion or truth behind the 
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claims, Wal-Mart secures low prices, the consumer buys, and the supplier is not forced 
into joining the Blue Giant38. 
 The retailer has also mastered the use of technology to create an efficient, well-
run establishment.  The Wal-Marts of Mexico and America are “connected…(by a ) 
huge, automated distribution network” (Tilly, May 2005: 5).  This network also joins 
store and supplier so that no time is lost in replenishing popular items or recognizing 
failing ones. A May 11, 2006 on-line statement explains the role of technology: 
“(T)echnology plays an important role in helping Wal-Mart stay customer 
focused. Wal-Mart invented the practice of sharing sales data via computer with 
major suppliers, such as Proctor & Gamble. Every time a box of Tide is rung up at 
the cash register, Wal-Mart's data warehouse takes note and knows when it is time 
to alert P&G to replenish a particular store. As a result, Wal-Mart stores rarely run 
out of stock of popular items.” (Wal-Mart on-line) 
EDLP and technology join forces to ensure the customer that they will find 
stocked goods at the lowest prices.  To further the belief that Wal-Mart is the cheapest, 
the retailer posts in-store price comparisons with competitors; this resulted in the retailer 
being kicked out of ANTAD, Mexico’s National Association of Supermarket and 
Department Stores (Tilly, May 2005). Additionally, the use of DCs amounts to savings.  
Rather than a supplier traveling to each Wal-Mart store or Wal-Mart traveling to a CA, 
the process is consolidated as the supplier travels to the DC.  The products are then 
transported to the nearest area stores.   
Interestingly, Wal-Mart’s wages and benefits do not follow the business model as 
seen in the United States.  In Mexico, Wal-Mart’s wages and benefits are comparable 
                                                
38 Though the argument may also be made that selling to Wal-Mart may become essential, as in the case of 
The Lovable Company.  While the supplier is not “forced” per se, the options may be meet Wal-Mart’s 
demands or go out of business.   
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with the next three largest supermarket chains (Tilly, Sept. 2005).  It is also not 
considered a low-end retailer as in the U.S.  Though touting the lowest prices, “Wal-Mart 
is far less affordable in Mexico than in the United States”(Tilly, May 2005: 7).   
 
The Competition 
The retailer’s business model prompted transformations within Mexico’s 
supermarket retail sector as the competition geared up to combat the Blue Giant.  The 
next three largest chains, Soriana, Comercial Mexicana, and Gigante, faced the retailer 
head-on by adopting their own forms of EDLPs, aggressively marketing price 
differences, and forming a buyers’ consortium (Tilly, May 2005).  This buyers’ alliance, 
Sinergía, allows the chains to buy in larger volumes from suppliers thus lowering prices 
for the consumer, a practice perfected by Wal-Mart.  Larger volumes are a positive for 
suppliers if they have the capacity to fill orders from both Wal-Mart and the alliance.  
Missing an opportunity to sell to the Blue Giant, for any reason, is not an option for some 
suppliers. Cristina Morales, an analyst at a Mexican brokerage firm, remarks that “(i)f  
you miss a sale for Walmex because you don’t want to give them the discount the they’re 
asking for, you could miss you annual sales target by as much as 50%” (Lagorce, 2003: 
1). 
As for the three alliance chains, the plan should prove beneficial if coordination is 
not a problem.  While the companies will “keep separate operations, distribution centers 
and pricing strategies, (they) must jointly decide which quantities of what products to buy 
together and coordinate shipping and inventory” (Lagorce, 2003: 1).  In fact, they are still 
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competing with one another and must balance the need to cooperate with the need to be 
distinct—from one another and from Wal-Mart.   
Soriana has proven to be the best of the bunch, making headway in the northern 
city of Monterrey where Wal-Mart faltered in securing higher-class customers.  Tilly 
explains that Soriana offers specialty food items including authentic Mexican offerings, 
and its ability to secure a loyal customer base grew their sales 160 percent between 1992 
and 2003 (Tilly, May 2005, Sept. 2005).  The pursuit of the higher-classes is a popular 
strategy as Comercial Mexicana works to draw customers such as Claudia Gonzalez, who 
avoids Wal-Mart because its customers “just aren’t like (her)” (Bensinger, 2005: 1).  
Bensinger describes the addition of cafés, fine foods, and specialty products as well as the 
development of higher-end goods (like Target) as attempts to create distance between the 
Blue Giant and the rest.  The author writes that this is “a bold move, especially in a 
country where 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line”; growing 
inequality and economic instability may undermine this “high-class” strategy (Bensinger, 
2005: 2).  Not everyone is chasing the economic elite; Bensinger notes that Gigante has 
developed two formats, Super G and Bodega Gigante, which are very similar to Wal-
Mart’s Bodega Aurrera in that they offer fewer items and mostly staple goods. 
As evident by competitor acclimation to the Wal-Mart way, any effects produced 
by Wal-Mart may also be attributable to the competition.  Therefore the findings of this 
study will underestimate the greater effects of the entire supermarket sector.  The 
argument is not that Wal-Mart’s statistical effects are better or worse than those of the 
next three chains, but rather that Wal-Mart is leading the charge.  Its entrance into 
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Mexico propelled the already existing supermarket trend as seen in the transformation of 
its competition’s business and marketing strategies.   
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Section 4: 
 
Dataset Creation & Regression Results 
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Dataset Creation 
 
Using data from Mexico’s governmental statistics department, Instituto Nacional 
de Estadísticas Geografía e Informática (INEGI), Mexico’s official elections department, 
Instituto Federal Electoral, and Wal-Mart de México’s on-line annual reports, I created an 
original dataset to estimate Wal-Mart’s effect on the retail sector employment index. The 
dataset includes 196 observations for the years 1999-2005 (the number of years was 
determined by the available data for Wal-Mart stores).  The unit of analysis is a federal 
entity; Mexico has 32 federal entities consisting of 31 states and 1 federal district – 
Distrito Federal.   
The dataset includes observations for 28 of these entities, including the federal 
district.  The remaining four were excluded due to missing data; INEGI reports many 
statistics by urban or metropolitan area and does not include areas for four federal 
entities: Durango, Hidalgo, Nayarit, and Tlaxcala.  In a few cases, more than one urban 
area is reported for a federal entity, and I chose which urban area to report based on the 
inflation rate variable.  INEGI obtains its data on inflation from the Bancó de México 
which also reports inflation by urban area; however, Bancó uses a different set of areas 
for inflation than the set that INEGI uses for its other economic statistics. In the cases 
where one Bancó area matched with one INEGI area, the choice was easy, and in the 
cases where more than one urban area was shared, I chose the capitals of each entity.  
There was no complex line of reasoning behind this choice, only the thought that no 
intentional bias was created in choosing the capital.   
The regression models control for economic, political, and geographic factors as I 
do not wish to blame Wal-Mart for employment trends that are a consequence of national 
 52
trends.  I also use panel corrected standard error regressions39, and I use an error 
correction model.  The data cover a 7-year period, therefore caution is used when 
correcting for time-series issues, such as autocorrelation, as I do not want to burden the 
data with too many corrections.  However, I want to account for time trends. 
Additionally, each of the independent variables is lagged one year40, as I believe that the 
effect on one year’s employment retail index is a result of the previous year’s trends.  
These various measures are intended to control for the effects of time so that the model is 
able to isolate the relationship between the independent variables and the employment 
index. 
The models also contain “noisy” data and are therefore predisposed to statistically 
insignificant results.  Due to data availability issues, the use of weighted variables to 
measure the number of Wal-Mart stores was necessary, resulting in observations that are 
best statistical guesses of the true nature of the variable.  Urban areas would have been 
the ideal choice for the unit of analysis, however, as Wal-Mart data was only available on 
a regional level, I felt that creating a variable by city, as opposed to federal entity, would 
further burden the stores variables.   The use of urban areas as the measurement for many 
variables coupled with a federal entity unit of analysis may result in an underestimation 
of the results.     
Considering these various factors, my focus is on result trends, and robust 
findings are a bonus.  I will not claim that this dataset is without fault, instead, I 
recognize the weaknesses and take caution when making conjectures or laying blame.  
However, I believe that the necessary measures have been taken so that the results may 
                                                
39 The regressions were estimated using the ‘xtpcse’ command in STATA 9.   
40 Fixed effects and year dummy variables are not lagged. 
 53
be considered a fair indication of what is taking place in the Mexican retail sector.  I 
couple this caveat with a detailed explanation of variable creation in an effort to be as 
forthright as possible of dataset weaknesses. 
To estimate how Wal-Mart’s presence affects retail sector employment, the 
following regression models are used (the differences between the two are in bold):  
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(Average Number of Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + ∑Di,tαi + εi,t 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(GDP-Weighted Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + ∑Di,tαi + εi,t 
 
where: 
Retail Employment Index = retail employment index relative to the base year of 1994 
Average Number of Wal-Mart Stores = number of Wal-Mart stores based on average 
GDP-Weighted Wal-Mart Stores = number of Wal-Mart stores, based on GDP weight 
Standard Deviation of Inflation = standard deviation of the annual inflation rate 
Retail Sales = measures the change in annual retail sector sales 
Year = dummy variable for years 1999-2005 
PAN = dummy variable for PAN governor 
PRI = dummy variable for PRI governor 
PRD = dummy variable for PRD governor 
D = federal entity fixed effects  
 
 The independent variable measures the levels of the retail sector employment 
index relative to the base year of 1994.  This variable is reported by urban area and was 
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created by averaging the monthly indexes for each year.  The index change relative to the 
base is reported in percentage figures, not in raw numbers.  This is important when 
evaluating the results as a -0.5 value indicates a 0.5 percent decrease in the employment 
index rather than indicating the loss of “half” of a retail sector job.  
 The Wal-Mart stores variables include only the retailer’s self-service formats and 
exclude its restaurant and department store formats.  The reason for this is twofold.  First, 
the creation of these variables is based on regional data and the process is already marred 
by uncertainty.  Recall that four federal entities are not included in the dataset, but, due to 
the regional nature of the Wal-Mart data, the stores variables will include those entities’ 
stores in the total.  The exclusion of Wal-Mart’s restaurant and department stores ensures 
that the results are not inflated, but are likely underestimations of the actual effect. 
 Secondly, Wal-Mart is serving as a representative of the supermarket trend which, 
as outlined, refers to the proliferation of self-service grocery stores throughout Latin 
America.  For this reason, including department stores and restaurants in the total would 
detract from the greater purpose of making generalizations regarding the competition.  I 
would rather maintain the ability to make comparisons across supermarket chains than 
possibly achieve more dramatic results.  
The two variables that measure the number of Wal-Mart stores are weighted 
variables.  Being a weighted measurement, I thought it best to estimate two regression 
models and report consistent trends.  The intent is that these extra measures serve as a 
“control” for any biases that arise in the creation of the variable.  The first, which is 
referred to as the average number of Wal-Mart stores, was created by dividing the total 
number of stores within a region by the number of federal entities within that region.  
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Each entity, regardless of its characteristics, received the same amount of stores as the 
other entities within their region.  This weight will give some federal entities more stores 
than they should have and other significantly less, and any biases created will likely be 
cancelled out by one another.   
 The second, referred to as the GDP-weighted variable, assigns the number of 
stores based on the federal entities’ percent participation in the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the commercial area of economic activity, referred to in this paper as retail 
GDP.  This economic area is listed as comercio, restaurantes, hoteles, and its index 
values are relative to the prices of the base year of 1993.  The variable was created by 
calculating each region’s share of retail GDP, then determining each entity’s proportion 
of that share, and finally, multiplying that proportion of retail GDP by the total number of 
Wal-Marts within the region.  The theory is that the entities that contribute a greater share 
to retail GDP will likely have more Wal-Mart stores than those with a lesser share. 
   Next, to control for trends in consumption, the standard deviation of inflation, 
reported by urban areas, is used.  Consumer buying power is affected by increases and 
decreases of the inflation rate and the uncertainty of prices, and consumption trends, 
regardless of their nature, should not be attributed to Wal-Mart.  The standard deviation is 
used to measure uncertainty as this uncertainty may prove more detrimental to stores than 
actual inflation rates.  Shops and supermarkets can plan on there being ups and downs, 
but the uncertainty of the timing and the nature of those trends may prove difficult to 
anticipate.  This is especially relevant for the smaller “mom and pop shops” whose 
owners likely lack a thorough knowledge of economic indicators.  Regressions were 
estimated using the annual rate of inflation as well, but the standard deviation models 
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were most consistently statistically significant. The annual rate was created by taking the 
monthly average relative to the base year of the second fortnight in June 2002 and 
calculating the standard deviation.   
 The retail sales variable controls for overall retail sector trends.  An overall 
downward trend in sales may result in worker redundancies, and as with inflation, Wal-
Mart should not be blamed or lauded for general trends.  Capturing these trends is the 
reason for choosing to include the entire sector’s sales rather than only Wal-Mart’s share.  
The annual sales index change was created by taking the average monthly value relative 
to the base year of 1994 and then calculating the change in retail sales from one year to 
the next.   
 The year dummy variable, which spans the years 1999-2005, accounts for yearly 
trends, for example, economic shocks or downward employment trends, that are not 
captured by the remaining variables.  As these are time-series data, this variable also aids 
in de-trending the data so that Wal-Mart’s effects can be isolated, and it also controls for 
the relationship that the present year’s employment index has with the previous year’s 
index. 
 To control for political trends, the PRI, PAN (National Action Party), and PRD 
(Party of the Democratic Revolution) dummy variables are used.  These refer to the 
political party affiliation of the governor of each entity.  While Mexico has been on a 
neoliberal economic path for nearly two decades, it is a federal system, and this variable 
controls for political actions taken at the state level.  
 Finally, federal entity fixed effects control for any yet unmeasured trends.  These 
are measured by creating dummy variables for the 28 entities, and are necessary as the 
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differences between districts are great.  The number of Wal-Mart stores varies greatly; for 
example, in 2005 Distrito Federal had 146 stores and Baja California Sur had none.  The 
fixed effects allow for a comparison between federal districts by controlling for the 
extensive differences between them.   
 
Results 
The following regression models were estimated: 
Regression Models Using the Average Store Variable  
See Table 1 for Estimated Coefficient Values 
 
Ia (XTPCSE) 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(Average Number of Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4 (PAN)i,t-1 + β5 (PRI)i,t-1  + 
β6 (PRD)i,t-1  + εi,t 
 
IIa (XTPCSE) 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(Average Number of Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + εi,t  
 
IIIa (XTPCSE) 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1 (Average Number of Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + ∑Di,tαi + εi,t 
 
IVa (XTPCSE) with fix for autocorrelation 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(Average Number of Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t  + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + ∑Di,tαi + εi,t 
 
Va (XTPCSE) with fix for autocorrelation, without fixed effects  
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(Average Number of Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t  + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + εi,t 
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Regression Models Using the GDP-Weighted Store Variable 
See Table 2 for Estimated Coefficient Values 
 
Ib (XTPCSE) 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(GDP-Weighted Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4 (PAN)i,t-1 + β5 (PRI)i,t-1  + 
β6 (PRD)i,t-1  + εi,t 
 
IIb (XTPCSE) 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(GDP-Weighted Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t  + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + εi,t 
 
IIIb (XTPCSE) 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(GDP-Weighted Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + ∑Di,tαi + εi,t 
 
IVb (XTPCSE) with fix for autocorrelation 
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1 (GDP-Weighted Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + ∑Di,tαi +  εi,t 
 
Vb (XTPCSE) with fix for autocorrelation, without fixed effects  
 
(Retail Employment Index)i,t = β0 + β1(GDP-Weighted Wal-Mart Stores)i,t-1 + 
β2(Standard Deviation of Inflation)i,t-1 + β3(Retail Sales)i,t-1 + β4(YEAR)i,t + β5 (PAN)i,t-1 
+ β6 (PRI)i,t-1  + β7 (PRD)i,t-1  + εi,t 
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The results are consistent between models using the average store variable and 
those using the GDP-weighted variable41.  Sensitivity and specification tests were also 
conducted (see Appendices I and II for test results)42.  As these are panel data, corrections 
for autocorrelation were made and are noted when included in the regression.     
 In all of these regressions, the Wal-Mart store variables estimated coefficients are 
negative and, excluding regressions IIIb and IVb, statistically significant.  It is safe to 
conclude then, that the addition of Wal-Mart stores results in a decrease of the retail 
sector employment index relative to the base year of 1994 (see Graph 2 & Graph 3).  The 
standard deviation of inflation estimated coefficients are also consistently negative and 
are statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence interval 4 out of 10 times.  These 
negative values are to be expected as higher inflation may result in reduced sales which 
may lead to employee redundancies; it may also lead to decreased investment which 
could mean that fewer jobs are “created”.  Although “creation” may not be the 
appropriate word here as more Wal-Mart stores, which “create” jobs, also result in a 
decreased employment index.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 In addition to Panel Corrected Standard Error regressions (XTPCSE), XTREG and XTGLS panel data 
regression models were estimated.  Though the results were not robust, the estimated coefficients were 
similar.  Wal-Mart store variables estimated coefficients were consistently negative. 
42 Regressions were estimated after dropping observations identified as outliers by the Cook’s D statistic, 
and while the results were not robust, estimated coefficients were similar.  Please refer to Appendices I and 
II for these regression tables. 
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 While finding that Wal-Mart’s presence has a negative effect on the retail sector 
employment index was the purpose of this study, it is also necessary to discuss additional 
trends that occur when certain variables are included or excluded (please refer again to 
Table 1 and Table 2).  The first and second regression models, Ia, IIa, and Ib, IIb, exclude 
the fixed effects.  In each of these regressions the Wal-Mart store estimated coefficients 
are negative and robust with p-values less than 0.01.  The second regressions, IIa and IIb, 
include the year dummy variable, which although not statistically significant, has a 
negative coefficient indicating an overall downward trend in employment.   
With the addition of fixed effects in regressions IIIa and IIIb, the year variable 
estimated coefficients switch signs although they are still not robust.  This indicates that 
the fixed effects are catching the negative employment trends previously caught by the 
year variable.  Additionally, controlling for entity-unique trends drastically reduces the 
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value of the PAN and PRI estimated coefficients and renders them statistically 
insignificant; also, in both regressions, the PAN dummy variable estimated coefficients 
are no longer positive.  The average Wal-Mart store variable is robust even with the 
inclusion of the fixed effects; however in regression IIIb, the GDP-weighted store 
variable is no longer robust.  It is probable that the fixed-effects are causing an increase 
in the standard error, but it should be noted that the estimated coefficient remains 
negative and the value is similar to the GDP-weighted Wal-Mart store coefficient in 
regression IIb.   
Regressions IVa and IVb include a control for autocorrelation, and the estimated 
coefficients in each regression are similar to the previous regressions, indicating that even 
with controls for panel data, the negative relationship between Wal-Mart stores and the 
retail employment index is maintained.  The last set of regressions, Va and Vb, include 
autocorrelation corrections but exclude the fixed effects.  The effect of this exclusion is 
seen in the governor dummy variables, as both have estimated coefficients above 500, 
and in the year coefficient which is again negative.  Although those results are not robust, 
the regressions indicate the important role that the fixed effects have in catching trends 
that are otherwise explained by the governor dummy variables.   
 Another interesting result is that the retail sector sales estimated coefficients are 
positive, but are never statistically significant.  Intuitively, it makes sense that increased 
sales would have a positive relationship with retail employment.  What is interesting is 
that regardless of the regression model, the results are not statistically significant43.  
Controlling for inflation, political trends, Wal-Mart stores, fixed effects and annual 
                                                
43 Retail sales estimated coefficients were robust in a basic regression estimated after dropping observations 
identified as outliers by the Cook’s D statistic but without controlling for autocorrelation.  Please refer to 
Appendices I and II for regression tables. 
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trends, retail sales do not have a robust relationship with Mexico’s retail sector 
employment.  This is likely due to an overall downward trend in Mexico’s retail 
employment.     
 Finally, high levels of multicollinearity, and the presence of heteroscedasticity are 
issues that plague cross-sectional data resulting in inefficient regression models.  It was 
likely that the estimated regressions would have large standard errors and few robust 
results, however, the estimated coefficients of the Wal-Mart store variables were 
consistently robust across XTPCSE models.  For time-series data, autocorrelation may 
result in inflated t-values, and as a consequence, coefficients that are not robust may 
appear to be.  With only a seven-year time span, corrections had to be made cautiously, 
but were in fact included.   
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Section 5: 
 
Conclusions & Further Study 
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Controlling for time, employment, economic, political, and geographic trends, I 
find that Wal-Mart’s presence has a negative effect on retail sector employment.  As for 
Wal-Mart’s future in Mexico, those arguing that future economic stagnation may 
jeopardize the Blue Giant’s growth may prove correct as the liberalization policies, which 
aided in Wal-Mart’s entrance, may backfire on its ability to grow.  Tilly writes that 
“neoliberal policies have not brought Mexico sustained growth or broadly shared 
prosperity—and the resulting economic stagnation threatens Wal-Mart’s prospects for 
growth” (Tilly, Sept. 2005: 12).  An economically polarized population would reduce the 
number of middle-class shoppers presently supporting the retailer.  Tilly also argues that 
the competition’s ability to conform quickly and compete is a threat as are pressing 
public policy issues at the forefront of the 2006 presidential elections.   
President Fox is considering the institution of a value-added tax, a policy, which 
Wal-Mart and its competitors could not avoid, but would not touch the small, local 
merchants that are able to be more creative when reporting sales; this would be an 
advantage, of sorts, to the traditional sector44 (Tilly, Sept 2005).  While free trade and 
free market has been the political environment the last few decades, Mexico’s populist 
base along with political actors are calling for government to slow the Blue Giant and the 
next leader may respond (Tilly, May 2005).   
 Yet in spite of the dismal future that Wal-Mart appears to be facing, it should be 
remembered that the retailer overcame economic crises in the 1990s, outlasted other 
foreign establishments, and, in 2001, its sales surpassed the combined sales of it top three 
competitors (see Figure 1) (Tilly, 2005) .  Wal-Mart did not become the world’s largest 
                                                
44 While the VAT tax may negatively affect the supermarkets’ bottom line, it is unlikely that it will run 
them out of business.  The “comparative advantage”, therefore, should not be given too much credit. 
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multinational company without anticipating and preparing for economic and political 
obstacles.  Therefore, it would be unwise to count the company out simply because 
Soriana is making strides and Fox may be broadening the tax base.  As Mexico’s largest 
private employer, the government is as likely to respond to Wal-Mart as its citizens and 
Mexico’s commitment to free trade and free market will probably not be reversed 
because of one retailer’s success.  
Furthermore, Wal-Mart’s effects are not only seen in retail employment but also 
in retail sales. The retailer is not producing an increase in aggregate retail sales as the 
number of stores appears to have no correlation with the level of retail sales.  What does 
this mean?  These results indicate that not only is the retailer’s presence negatively 
related to employment, it may also be negatively related to the living standards of small 
shop owners in the retail sector.  How so?  Wal-Mart’s sales are increasing (see Figure 1), 
yet overall retail sales are not (see Graph 4).  The Blue Giant is not creating sales, but is 
taking more of the retail economic pie.   
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FIGURE 1: 
Figure 1: Wal-Mex sales compared to sum of three top competitors, 1992-2003
(Sales in billions of 2002 pesos)
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Source: Data from Expansión magazine, compiled by Enrique Dussel Peters, UNAM, Mexico City as 
reproduced in Tilly, Sept. 2005. 
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This can have two effects on the competition depending on the type of retailer.  A 
modern supermarket or even a small traditional grocery store that hires outside 
employees can respond to a decreased sales share by making workers redundant, thus 
recouping lost sales with the wages of former employees.  Family-owned and operated 
stores that “employ” family members do not have the luxury of firing them, but must 
reduce their personal consumption.  If they are “lucky”, this may mean less disposable 
income, if they are not, this may mean less food on the table.   
One could argue that the family members should go outside of the family business 
and find a job.  If the negative retail employment trend holds, then finding a job in the 
retail sector may prove unlikely, unless, they are able to secure one of the jobs “created” 
by Wal-Mart.  As many family-owned shops are operated by less educated citizens, 
entering the formal sector is also unlikely.   
 71
Of course, finding a job rests on the assumption that there are jobs to be found 
which, in Mexico, has not been the case.  According to a 2004-2005 economic survey of 
Mexico, the open unemployment rate grew by 0.50 percent and the permanent 
employment rate rose only 1.2 percent after declining the three years prior, and it is the 
informal sector45 that absorbs many of the 1.2 million people entering the workforce each 
year (ECLAC, 2004-2005).  While permanent employment may have experienced an 
increase, those in the informal sector forced to find new jobs are facing competition from 
an onslaught of new entrants.  
 In the formal sector, jobs increased at a lower rate in 2004 than in 2000 and 
manufacturing sector employment fell by 2.6 percent (ECLAC, 2004-2005).  In general, 
if employment is not decreasing in Mexico, the posted increases are minimal and 
insufficient to support the number of people entering the job market each year.  
Additionally, “(c)ontinuing the trend observed since 2002…(the) unit labour costs 
dropped in all sectors…4.8% in commerce” (ECLAC, 2004-2005: 257).  Therefore, the 
wages of the available jobs are declining, thus those fortunate enough to have a job must 
contend with the declining wage trend.    
This is the crux of the matter.  In the retail sector those competitive enough to stay 
in business or find alternative work are still vulnerable to declining retail sales and wage 
trends.  Though not retail workers, the agricultural sector illustrates the point beautifully.  
Assume that a group of small farmers successfully market themselves to a supermarket 
chain and succeed in providing the produce and meeting the demands of the business.  
They have done it; they have modernized and become victors in the process of 
                                                
45 The informal sector is distinct from the formal sector in that it is unregulated and does not adhere to 
government wage and benefit regulations.  It actually “illegal” but is not policed.   
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international economic integration and the global competition that accompanies it.  
Except as supermarkets secure more of the market farmers face a downstream 
monopsony coupled with an overall downward retail sales trend, the result: declining 
prices.  Those without jobs are not able to be active consumers, and without consumption 
sales decrease, and as sales decrease, supermarkets and grocery stores may fire more, hire 
fewer, and buy less. 
Is this all Wal-Mart’s fault?  Should NAFTA be revoked and globalization halted 
(assuming those were options)?  No, to all of the above.  Wal-Mart is a successful 
business that has done all the “right” things in today’s economy: secured the lowest 
prices, mastered the use of technology, redefined retail efficiency, and become the 
company to emulate.  Does it employ repulsive methods to secure those low prices and 
run others out of business who cannot modernize fast enough?  This much has been 
suggested.  Loving or hating the Blue Giant may hinge on your fixed values, but one 
thing is certain, personal opinions will not make them go away.  Likewise, personal 
views on trade agreements and globalization will not stop the processes.  The attention 
must shift to dealing with the negative externalities of these phenomena and procuring 
positive outcomes.  Debate and discourse have their time and place, but whether a skeptic 
or a globalist, conversation about the evils or virtues of globalization, separate from ways 
to cope with its negative externalities, should be set aside.   
For example, NAFTA’s failures should not simply be debated, but solutions 
should be discussed.  NAFTA was supposed to attract foreign investors that would create 
jobs and opportunity thereby easing social unrest, and has thus far been unsuccessful.  
Protectionist policies did not solve societal ills and economic instability and neither has 
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free-trade.  The Mexican government must be willing to evaluate the success of recent 
economic reform, disregarding personal economic beliefs.  Wanting decreased trade 
barriers and a reduction in social provisions to be the solution does not make it one. 
Perhaps the current situation in Mexico will prove to be short-term growing pains, but 
regardless, discussions of feasible development options must begin.   
Then again, maybe the answer is that an entirely new look at development is 
necessary.  Viewing development from an economic standpoint means that if Mexico 
experiences a higher GDP per capita and increased foreign investment, things are in an 
upswing.  But what if the extra income goes to the top ten percent and the investment 
does not lead to increased employment or improved wages?  Is it still a success?  
Admitting that a freer market is not successful in providing for every facet of society 
does not mean that it needs to be scrapped, just understood for what it can and cannot do.  
A government should not dump the responsibility of providing for the people onto an 
economic system, at least not a government that spent years redistributing land and 
providing subsidies.  That may sound like heresy to most conservatives, but wanting 
more than economic development and recognizing that free trade and small government 
alone do not guarantee success must be acknowledged. 
 
Further Study 
 The exact number of Wal-Mart stores located in each federal entity must be found 
to improve the integrity of the dataset.  The years 1997 and 1998 certainly must be added 
as well as thinking of statistically sound ways to include the Wal-Mart stores that existed 
prior to its majority ownership of Cifra.  Additionally, knowing the location of each store 
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would allow me to use the urban area rather than the federal entity as the unit of analysis.    
It would also be interesting to include the annual sales for Wal-Mart’s self-service 
formats and estimate a statistical relationship between Wal-Mart sales and aggregate 
retail sales as well as Wal-Mart sales and employment.  Conjectures of these relationships 
have been formed with the use of illustrative graphs, but estimating regressions is 
necessary to understand the relationships fully. 
 The addition of the stores and sales from the competition would be useful to see if 
the negative employment trend is exacerbated by the presence of Soriana, Comercial 
Mexicana, and Gigante.  Also, finding data specific to the traditional retail sector would 
enable me to analyze Wal-Mart’s effects on family-operated shops rather than simply 
overall retail sector employment.  Ideally, my dependent variable would be number of 
self-employed within the retail sector.  The majority of the self-employed will fall in the 
traditional sector due to the number of family-operated establishments, for example 
“mom and pop shop” owners as opposed to Wal-Mart employees.   
In addition to employment, Wal-Mart effects retail sector sales and this 
relationship deserves further study. As mentioned, it is unlikely that the family-operated 
stores are closing up shop but they are likely losing sales; this could be determined by 
isolating the effects of Wal-Mart stores and sales on the retail sales share of these specific 
stores.  Focusing on the redistribution of retail sales, I could determine if the modern 
retailer affects the small store owners’ quality of life.   
 With the abundance of literature discussing how supermarkets are affecting the 
agricultural sector, statistically isolating the effects would prove useful when considering 
policy measures to support farmers in becoming competitive or in finding alternative 
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employment.  This issue of exit options would itself be an interesting study, if there is a 
viable way to analyze whether or not options exist for certain sectors of the Mexican 
economy.   
 Options are abundant for this particular question, and data mining has proven to 
be the greatest stumbling block.  Ideally, this research will take me to Mexico where I can 
visit local Chambers of Commerce and talk with family-shop owners.  Finally, I am 
presently working on estimating a regression using survey data from Mexico.  The 
question is “what type of person has confidence in NAFTA”.  This will be included in the 
final draft of this project as an accompaniment to the Globalization section and will 
hopefully add an additional human dimension to the project. 
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Appendix I 
 
Sensitivity & Specification Tests: 
 
Regressions Using the Average Stores Variable 
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Federal Entity Codes 
 
f1 Aguascalientes    
f2 Baja California  
f3 Baja California Sur 
f4 Campeche  
f5 Coahuila de Zaragoza  
f6 Colima    
f7 Chiapas  
f8 Chihuahua  
f9 Distrito Federal   
f10 Guanajuato  
f11 Guerrero  
f12 Jalisco              
f13 México  
f14 Michoacán de Ocampo 
f15 Morelos  
f16 Nuevo León  
f17 Oaxaca    
f18 Puebla     
f19 Querétaro Arteaga    
f20 Quintana Roo     
f21 San Luis Potosí  
f22 Sinaloa    
f23 Sonora    
f24 Tabasco  
f25 Tamaulipas  
f26 Veracruz de Ignacio de Llave  
f27 Yucatán  
f28 Zacatecas  
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Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity is always present; however, tests were conducted to determine to what 
degree collinearity is present. Time-series variables were not allowed, thus the absence of 
lagged variables. 
 
Pairwise Correlation: 
 
• It is likely that the relationship between the PAN (pan) and PRI (gpri) governor 
variables stems from their similar views on conservative fiscal policy.  
 
Variable Employment 
Index 
Average 
Stores 
St. Dev. 
Inflation
Retail 
Sales 
Year PAN PRI PRD 
Employment 
Index 
1.00 -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.25 -0.22 -0.01 
Average 
Stores 
 1.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.10 -0.08 -0.23 0.41 
St. Dev. 
Inflation 
  1.00 -0.07 -0.62 0.08 0.01 -0.12 
Retail Sales    1.00 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.08 
Year     1.00 0.05 -0.10 0.08 
PAN      1.00 -0.70 -0.27 
PRI       1.00 -0.50 
PRD        1.00 
 
 
Variance Inflation Factor 
 
While the mean variance inflation factor of 17.91 is greater than 10, indicating that the 
degree of multicollinearity is a problem, the reported regressions do not suffer from large 
variances.  The average stores variable is consistently robust. 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Average Stores  201.50 0.00 
St. Dev. of Inflation 2.00 0.50 
Retail Sales 1.21 0.83 
Year  2.94 0.34 
PAN 21.51 0.05 
PRI 18.38 0.05 
PRD   
Mean VIF 17.91  
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Heteroscedasticity 
 
As heteroscedasticity may be a problem in cross-sectional data, the Breusch-Pagan / 
Cook-Weisberg test was conducted. 
 
Hettest: 
 
The null hypothesis that constant variance exists may be rejected.  However, because the 
dataset is cross-sectional and time-series, panel corrected standard errors were used 
(XTPCSE).   
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of retail employment index 
          
chi2 527.95 
P > chi2 0.00 
 
 
Studentized Residuals: 
 
The following observations fell outside of the parameters (-2   2): 
 
Federal 
Entity 
 
Year 
 
Aguascalientes 2001 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2005 
Chiapas 2004 
Zacatecas 2002 
Zacatecas 2003 
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Studentized Residuals Scatter Plot Graphs:  
Note: Lagged variables are used. 
 
A persistent outlier is Chiapas 2004 which is seen in the upper left-hand corner of the 
stores, standard deviation of inflation, and sales scatter plots.   
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Autocorrelation 
 
Autocorrelation is generally a problem in time-series data due to the correlation between 
years. The Durbin-Watson test could not be conducted due to the use of panel-data. 
However, the regression models include corrections for autocorrelation. 
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Outliers 
 
Two tests were conducted to determine outliers: DF Beta and Cook’s D. 
 
DF Beta: Lagged Variables could not be used. 
 
Average Stores 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Baja California Sur  
2003 
Baja California Sur  
2004 
 
Standard Deviation of Inflation 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Aguascalientes 2001 
Zacatecas 2004 
 
Retail Sales 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Baja California Sur 2003 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2005 
Chiapas 2004 
Zacatecas 2002 
Zacatecas 2003 
Zacatecas 2005 
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Year 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Aguascalientes 1999 
Aguascalientes 2001 
Chiapas 2005 
Chihuahua 2005 
Zacatecas 1999 
Zacatecas 2000 
Zacatecas 2001 
Zacatecas 2004 
Zacatecas 2005 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Aguascalientes 1999 
Aguascalientes 2004 
Aguascalientes 2005 
 
PAN 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Baja California Sur 1999 
Baja California Sur 2000 
Baja California Sur 2001 
Distrito Federal 1999 
 
PRI 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Baja California Sur 1999 
Baja California Sur 2000 
Baja California Sur 2001 
Distrito Federal 1999 
 
PRD 
Federal Entity Year 
Baja California Sur 1999 
Baja California Sur 2000 
Baja California Sur 2001 
Distrito Federal 1999 
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Cook’s D46: 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Aguascalientes 2001 
Baja California Sur 2003 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2005 
Chiapas  2004 
Zacatecas 2002 
Zacatecas 2003 
 
Regression without Cook’s D outliers: No correction for autocorrelation. 
 
 
Employment Index Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t| 
Average Stores -0.86 0.81 -1.06 0.29 
St. Dev. Inflation -12.91 8.08 -1.60 0.11 
Retail Sales 0.51 0.19 2.71 0.01 
Year 1.81 1.36 1.32 0.19 
PAN -1.40 13.90 -0.10 0.92 
PRI -2.19 11.55 -0.19 0.850 
PRD     
Constant -3395.47   2672.39   -1.27 0.21 
N F P > F Adj. R2 Root MSE 
162 213.53 0.00 0.98 17.15 
 
Regression without Cook’s D outliers: Corrected for autocorrelation. 
 
 
Employment Index Coefficient Robust SE t P > |t| 
Average Stores -0.86 0.66 -1.30 0.21 
St. Dev. Inflation -12.91 7.42 -1.74 0.09 
Retail Sales 0.51 0.45 1.13 0.27 
Year 1.81 1.83 0.98 0.33 
PAN -1.40 7.69 -0.18 0.86 
PRI -2.19 8.49 -0.26 0.80 
PRD     
Constant -3395.47 3623.10 -0.94 0.36 
N F P > F R2 Root MSE
162   0.98 17.15 
 
 
 
 
                                                
46 Note: Cook’s D outliers include Chiapas 2004 which was a persistent studentized residual outlier; it has 
been dropped in the above regressions.   
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Appendix II 
 
Sensitivity & Specification Tests: 
 
Regressions Using GDP-Weighted Stores Variable 
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Federal Entity Codes 
 
f1 Aguascalientes    
f2 Baja California  
f3 Baja California Sur 
f4 Campeche  
f5 Coahuila de Zaragoza  
f6 Colima    
f7 Chiapas  
f8 Chihuahua  
f9 Distrito Federal   
f10 Guanajuato  
f11 Guerrero  
f12 Jalisco              
f13 México  
f14 Michoacán de Ocampo 
f15 Morelos  
f16 Nuevo León  
f17 Oaxaca    
f18 Puebla     
f19 Querétaro Arteaga    
f20 Quintana Roo     
f21 San Luis Potosí  
f22 Sinaloa    
f23 Sonora    
f24 Tabasco  
f25 Tamaulipas  
f26 Veracruz de Ignacio de Llave  
f27 Yucatán  
f28 Zacatecas  
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Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity is always present; however, tests were conducted to determine to what 
degree collinearity is present. Time-series variables were not allowed, thus the absence of 
lagged variables. 
 
Pairwise Correlation: 
 
• It is likely that the relationship between the PAN (pan) and PRI (gpri) governor 
variables stems from their similar views on conservative fiscal policy.  
 
 
Variable 
Employment 
Index 
GDP-
Weighted 
Stores 
St. Dev. 
Inflation
Retail 
Sales 
Year PAN PRI PRD
Employment 
Index 
1.00 -0.07 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.25 -0.22 -0.01
GDP-
Weighted 
Stores 
 1.00 -0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.08 -0.21 0.39 
St. Dev. 
Inflation 
  1.00 -0.07 -0.62 0.08 0.01 -0.12
Retail Sales    1.00 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.08
Year     1.00 0.05 -0.10 0.08 
PAN      1.00 -0.70 -0.27
PRI       1.00 -0.50
PRD        1.00 
 
 
 
Variance Inflation Factor 
 
While the mean variance inflation factor of 13.38 is greater than 10, indicating that the 
degree of multicollinearity is a problem, the reported regressions do not suffer from large 
variances.  The GDP-weighted stores variable is consistently robust. 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
GDP-Weighted Stores  130.21 0.01 
St. Dev. of Inflation 2.00 0.50 
Retail Sales 1.21 0.83 
Year  2.79 0.38 
PAN 21.51 0.05 
PRI 18.51 0.05 
PRD   
Mean VIF 13.38  
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Heteroscedasticity 
 
As heteroscedasticity may be a problem in cross-sectional data, the Breusch-Pagan / 
Cook-Weisberg test was conducted. 
 
Hettest: 
 
The null hypothesis that constant variance exists may be rejected.  However, because the 
dataset is cross-sectional and time-series, panel corrected standard errors were used 
(XTPCSE).   
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of retail employment index 
 
chi2 535.73 
P > chi2 0.00 
 
 
Studentized Residuals: 
 
The following observations fell outside of the parameters (-2   2): 
 
Federal 
Entity 
 
Year 
 
Aguascalientes 2001 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2005 
Chiapas 2004 
Zacatecas 2002 
Zacatecas 2003 
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Studentized Residuals Scatter Plot Graph:  
Please refer to Appendix I for remaining studentized residual graphs.  
Note: Lagged variable is used. 
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Autocorrelation 
 
Autocorrelation is generally a problem in time-series data due to the correlation between 
years. The Durbin-Watson test could not be conducted due to the use of panel-data. 
However, the regression models include corrections for autocorrelation. 
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Outliers 
 
Two tests were conducted to determine outliers: DF Beta and Cook’s D. 
 
DF Beta: Lagged Variables could not be used. Please refer to Appendix I for remaining 
DF Beta tests. 
 
GDP-Weighted Stores 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Aguascalientes 2004 
Baja California Sur 2004 
Distrito Federal 1999 
 
 
Cook’s D: 
 
Federal Entity Year 
Aguascalientes 2001 
Baja California Sur 2003 
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2005 
Chiapas  2004 
Zacatecas 2002 
Zacatecas 2003 
 
Regression without Cook’s D outliers: No correction for autocorrelation. 
 
Employment Index Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t| 
GDP-Weighted Stores -0.54 0.64 -0.84 0.40 
St. Dev. Inflation -12.53 8.09 -1.55 0.12 
Retail Sales 0.51 0.19 2.69 0.01 
Year 1.59 1.34 1.19 0.24 
PAN -1.41 13.93 -0.10 0.92 
PRI -1.61 11.61 -0.14 0.89 
PRD     
Constant -2996.26 2632.92 -1.14 0.26 
N F P > F Adj. R2 Root MSE 
162 212.84 0.00 0.98 17.18 
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Regression without Cook’s D outliers: Corrected for autocorrelation. 
 
Employment Index Coefficient Robust SE t P > |t| 
GDP-Weighted Stores -0.54 0.79 -0.68 0.50 
St. Dev. Inflation -12.53 7.41 -1.69 0.10 
Retail Sales 0.51 0.44 1.17 0.25 
Year 1.59 2.34 0.68 0.50 
PAN -1.41 7.98 0.86 0.86 
PRI -1.61 9.21 -0.17 0.86 
PRD     
Constant -2996.26 4603.14 -0.65 0.52 
N F P > F R2 Root MSE
162   0.98 17.18 
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